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Autoethnography as
Constructionist _ Project

Laura L. Ellingson
Carolyn Ellis

everal years ago, we published an essay
in which we claimed that qualitative research can be productively thought
of as existing along a continuum. Ai-tistic
interpretivists anchor one end, whereas scientific positivists hold down the other. In between is a vast and varied middle ground
wherein most qualitative researchers locate
themselves (Ellis & Ellingson, 2000). We
constructed a nuanced range of possibilities
to describe what many others have socially
constructed as dichotomies (mutually exclusive, paired opposites), such as art- science,
hard-soft, and qualitative-quantitative (see
Potter, 1995). Dichotomous thinking remains the default mode of the academy.
"Language, and thus meaning, depends on a
system of differences," explains Gergen
(1994, p. 9). "These differences have been
cast in terms of binaries... . All are distin-

S

guished by virtue of what they are not." Nowhere is this evidenced more strongly than
in the quantitative-qualitative divide. Even
in qualitative work itself polarities m ark the
differences between interpretivists and realists (Atkinson, Coffey, Delamont, Lofland, &
Lofland, 2001; Bochner & Ellis, 1999). Recently autoethnographers have begun to distinguish themselves from one another by
separating evocative from analytic autoethnography. Analytic autoethnographers focus on developing theoretical explanations
of broader social phenomena, whereas evocative autoethnographers focus on narrative
presentations that open up conversations
and evoke emotional responses (Hunt &
J unco, 2006).
When Carolyn invited me (Laura) to coauthor this chapter, I accepted with enthusiasm, excited to be working with her again.
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Perusing the Handbook prospectus, I chuckled at the irony of the two of us jointly constructing a story about the intersections
between autoethnography and social constructionism once again. Those familiar with
Carolyn's methodological novel on autoethnography (Ellis, 2004) might recognize
me as the witty, weak-bladdered woman in
Carolyn's qualitative methods seminar.
Whereas Carolyn cheerfully explores my
bodily weakness to add levity to her story,
her discussion of my dissertation only hints
at the lengthy, intense saga of my negotiation with her and my committee over the
role autoethnography would play in my
ethnographic construction of an interdisciplinary geriatric oncology team. Thankfully,
the story had a happy ending; together we
resisted the art-science dichotomy and embraced crystallization, a postmodern form of
methodological tJ.iangulation that utilizes
multiple methods of analysis and multiple
genres of representation (Richardson,
2000). I combined narrative ethnography,
grounded theory analysis, autoethnography,
and feminist analyses into a single dissertation prqject, now revised into a book
(Ellingson, 2005a). In this chapter, Carolyn
and I continue that conversation, developing our conception of autoethnography as a
constructionist project.
When I (Carolyn) asked Laura to coauthor this chapter with me, I hesitated at first
as I thought about how insistent she had
been in her dissertation on including everything but "the kitchen sink." She wanted to
engage in crystallization and approach the
oncology team she studied from a variety of
perspectives. Her goal was to illuminate the
socially constructed world of the team while
simultaneously revealing the constructed nature of her multiple accounts of the team.
Yes, perhaps I would have preferred at the
time that Laura do it "my" way. Don't we all
want to reproduce ourselves? But I also
pride myself on helping students to find
their particular and unique voices, especially
if they are different from mine. I was leery of
Laura's proposed project because I've dis-

covered in my many years of directing
dissertations that the main roadblock for
students is that they try to do too much.
Then they encounter difficulty doing any
one thing deeply or thoroughly enough.
Laura was among the very best students I
had ever mentored, and I wanted her to succeed. Laura persevered, and I guess I
shouldn't have been surprised, given that
she was as astute at traditional analysis as she
was talented as a narrative writer, that she
pulled off an excellent dissertation that incorporated multiple perspectives and methods. In light of our experience, I thought she
would be the perfect coauthor for this chapter.
In this chapter, we explore autoethnography as a social constructionist project. We
want to resist the tendency to dichotomize
and instead explore how autoethnography
makes connections between seemingly polar
opposites. Though we see it as a sign of progress that authors desire to tease out differences in autoethnographic projects, we argue that concentrating on dichotomies is
counterproductive, given that autoethnography by definition operates as a bridge,
connecting autobiography and ethnography
in order to study the intersection of self and
others, self and culture.
After further detailing in this chapter the
limits of dichotomous thinking, we sketch
the meanings and goals of autoethnography.
We then discuss social constructionist concepts pertinent to autoethnography by deconstructing various methodological dichotomies.

The Limits
of Dichotomous Thinking
I (Laura) often feel! am channeling Carolyn
when I introduce the continuum of qualitative methods to my undergraduate qualitative students, so tied to our personal relationship is my knowledge of and passion for
qualitative methods. I recall with fondness
Carolyn's chart of qualitative research with
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the squiggly, broken line down the middle
between the art and science sides. "Qualitative as art and qualitative as science," she
adamantly, "are endpoints of a continlium. You have to decide where you want to
ibcate yourselves in terms of your identity
ind in every research project you do. That
location will determine your goals, the protedures you use, and the claims you make"
(Ellis, 2004, pp. 25-31 , 359-363).
\ I address the limits of dichotomous thinkirig early in my qualitative methods course,
tight after introducing social constructionism as the epistemology that underlies the
iliethodological continuum. "The central
~remise of social constructionism," I tell students, "is that meaning is not inherent. The
i::entral concerns of constructionist inquiry
ire to study what people 'know' and how
they create, apply, contest, and act upon
these ideas" (Harris, 2006, p. 225).
Ci My undergraduate students sit with their
~esks arranged in a circle, faces not yet
drooping with late-term fatigue but more
a few evidencing the mild resentment
$om of taking required courses. I discuss
fhe politics of the field of qualitative reiearch and how hotly contested many issues
~-e within the field, referencing their readofJames Potter (1995). My students look
me with naked disbelief when I add with a
~iriile, "And some of us actually care so
(li:eply and passionately about this stuff that
W,e have ongoing debates and dialogues and
fven get mad at each other sometimes!" The
ftudents shake their heads, mystified as to
li_ow anyone could care so much about such
~h:opic.
'fhThen I tell them that making sense of the
World through dichotomous thinking is unptoductive. "Dichotomies are pervasive in
M[estern thinking," I add, warming to my
J9pic, my excitement growing. The circle of
}fudents remains quite unexcited, but I continue.
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'''Knowledge is not 'out there' waitmg to
be found. Instead, we socially construct
knowledge in relationships, through for-
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mal channels, such as academic journals,
and through informal, interpersonal
interaction with others [Gergen, 1994].
Unfortunately, we are so schooled in
some ways of thinking that we no longer
notice how limiting those mental patterns
can be. There ai·e three ways in which dichotomies limit our thinking. You'll want
to take notes on this and ask me questions
if you don't understand, since this isn't in
the reading, and it will be on the exam."
This last comment brings them to rapt attention, and they poise their pens above
their notebooks as I explain.
"First, dichotomies present as opposites
what are actually interdependent. Socially
constructed opposites actually depend
upon each other for existence; without
women there would be no men, only people; without hard, there would be no soft,
only a single texture.
"Second, dichotomies limit the possibilities to two and only two, negating t11e
near-infinite possibilities present between
any two poles. Thus we can resist the limitations of femininity and masculinity as
mutually exclusive opposites and imagine
them instead as poles between which
there are many degrees of androgyny,
blended identities, and possible performances of sex, gender, and sexuality.
"Finally, when we limit possibilities to
only two, one will inevitably be valued
over the other. It is not possible to view
the world in terms of equal opposites; one
side is always already privileged."
As I finish the $tatement I notice I am leaning forward, gesturing enthusiastically, my
voice effortlessly projecting throughout the
room. One of my students, a lovely young
woman who works in my department office,
looks up at my impassioned soliloquy and
gives me an amused smile.
As my students dutifully scribble away, I
think back to my own courses in ,qualitative
methods with Carolyn, narrative inquiry and
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social constructionism courses with Art
Bochner, and feminist theory and methods
courses in women's studies, all of which challenged me to think beyond, through, and
around accepted (dichotomous) norms for
research and knowledge construction in academe. The fundamental axiom that culture
and meaning are socially constructed undergirded my graduate coursework, opening up
for me bountiful possibilities for challenging
the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life. I
try to offer my students the same.
I recall that Carolyn constructed qualitative methods not only as a continuum but as
a passionate pursuit. "I love method, as you
know," she reaffirmed in a recent e-mail. "I
like to figure out the process of how to know.
I am passionate about making methods
dovetail with life as lived, rather than with
rigid procedures." I couldn't have agreed
more, and her enthusiasm reinfected me immediately. Though I don't have as much success teaching undergraduates to love qualitative methods in a 10-week quarter as
Carolyn does teaching committed graduate
students in her interpretive studies program, many of my students report that they
find it at least palatable. I try to be content
with that.
Both of us teach the entire continuum but
locate ourselves between the middle and artistic ends. Carolyn more comfortably inhabits the near regions of the artistic pole than
Laura does, and Laura indulges more often
in systematic, middle-ground analyses than
Carolyn does (e.g., Ellingson, 2002, in pressb; Ellis, 1995, 2002c). But Carolyn has done
grounded analysis in the past (Ellis, 1986)
and sometimes now grounds her narratives
in theory and other voices (Ellis, 1998, 2000,
2002b ), and Laura writes artistic narratives and often includes long portions of
narrative in her grounded analysis pieces
(Ellingson, 2003, 2005a).
Both of us write from a social constructionist perspective, which provides the epistemological 1..mderpinniJ.1gs for autoethnography and other boundary-spanning
qualitative methods we embrace (Gubrium
& Holstein, 1997). Social constructionism,

we believe, is an approach particularly adept
at challenging fundamental dichotomies,
not only those in society in general but also
those that structure traditional approaches
to research, such as:
~

Self-other

o Subject- object
., Humanities-social science
e Process-product
• Personal-political
o Emotional- rational
C!)

Passionately involved- neutral

C!)

Evocative-analytic

We view autoethnography as a social constructionist approach that enables critical
reflection on taken-for-granted aspects of society, groups, relationships, and the self.
Autoethnography becomes a space in which
an individual's passion can bridge individual
and collective experience to enable richness
of representation, complexity of understanding, and inspiration for activism.

Defining Autoethnography
Autoethnography is research, writing, story,
and method that connect the autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and
political (Ellis, 2004, p. xix). It is the study of
a culture of which one is a part, integrated
with one's relational and inward experiences. The author incorporates the "I'' into
research and writing, yet analyzes self as if
studying an "other" (Ellis, 2004; Goodall,
2000). Autoethnography displays multiple
layers of consciousness, connecting the
personal to the cultural. Autoethnographic
texts appear in a valiety of forms-short stoiies, poetry, fiction, novels, photographicessays, personal essays, journals, fragmented
and layered writing, and social science
prose. In these texts, the workings of the self
are expressed emotionally, physically, and
cognitively. These texts feature concrete
action, emotion, embodiment, spirituality,
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and introspection, which appear as relational and institutional stories influenced by history, social structure, and culture, which
themselves are revealed dialectically
through action, feeling, thought, and language. Autoethnography portrays meaning
through dialogue, scenes, characterization,
and plot, claiming the conventions of literary writing (Ellis, 2004, p. xix; Ellis &
Bochner, 2000).
Similar to many terms used by social scientists, the meanings and applications of autoethnography have evolved in a manner that
makes precise definition difficult. We include under the broad rubric of autoethnography those studies that have been referred to by other similarly situated terms,
such as: personal narratives (Personal Narratives Group, 1989), narratives of the self(Richardson, 1994), personal experience narratives
(Denzin, 1989), personal essays (Krieger,
1991), ethnographic short stories (Ellis, 1995),
writing stories (Richardson, 1997), selfethnography (Van Maanen, 1995), emotionalism (Gub1ium & Holstein, 1997), radical empiricism (Jackson, 1989), and many others
(see Ellis & Bochner, 2000, pp. 739-740).
Autoethnography is a blurred genre.
Whether we call a work an autoethnography
or an ethnography depends as much on the
claims made by authors as anything else
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000). We desire to be inclusive rather than exclusive, to focus on
(commonalities among terms and projects
rather than differences. Autoethnography
as a genre frees us to move beyond traditional methods of writing (Gergen &
:Gergen, 2002), promoting narrative and po:etic forms, displays of artifacts, photographs, drawings, and live performances
((Ellis, 2004). The predominant form consists
F6f short stories written by researchers who
systematically introspect and record their
'. experience with the intent of evoking emo\tional response from readers. Thus auto'§ thnographers connect the imaginative style
~f literature with the rigor of social science
.ethnography.
.... Autoethnographers vary in their emphafsis on the writing and research process
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(graphy), culture (ethnos), and self (auto)

(Reed-Dana.hay, 1997, p. 2). Different exemplars of autoethnography fall at different
places along the continuum of each of these
three axes. For example, Laurel Richardson
sees herself as a writer and focuses on
graphy, often writing about writing (Richardson, 2000; Richardson & Lockridge, 2004).
Carolyn often focuses on the self, and Laura
often focuses on culture. In all these cases,
however, the authors include all three dimensions in their works, and how much of
each is included differs in the various projects they do.
Although some types of autoethnographic writing focus on the voice and point
of view of the primary author (Jago, 2006;
Kiesinger, 2002; Secklin, 2001; Spry, 1997),
the genre also includes multivoiced narratives in which authors weave their stories
with those of other participants (Boylorn,
2006; Drew, 2001; Ellingson, 2005a; Holman
Jones, 1998) and coauthors (Ellis, Kiesinger,
& Tillmann-Healy, 1997). Coconstructed
narratives, interactive interviews, and interactive focus groups are variations of this interactive approach (Davis & Ellis, in press;
Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Ellis et al., 1997).
These techniques allow autoethnographers
to more fully understand the lived experiences and relationship practices that occur
in interaction with others and in groups and
systems, as well as the multiple interpretations, experiences, and voices that emerge in
lives and stories.

Autoethnography as a Social
Constructionist Project
The practice of autoethnography presumes
that reality is socially constructed and that
meaning is constructed through symbolic
(language) interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Presuming that reality is socially constructed enables autoethnographers to counter accepted claims about "the
way things are" or "the way things always
have been." As described earlier, autoethnography is a broad and wonderfully ambig-
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uous category that encompasses a wide array
of practices. As authors, we remain ever cognizant of how we participate in the social
construction of the field of autoethnography by participating in this discourse that
is both autoethnographic and about autoethnography.
On the one hand, we have much in common: Laura seeks multigenre crystallization
in her work (Ellingson, 2005a), and Carolyn
advocates that "analysis and story also can
work together" (Ellis, 1993; Ellis & Bochner,
2006, p. 444). Laura learned about autoethnography from Carolyn, who mentored
her throughout her PhD program and beyond, thus significantly influencing Laura's
understanding of herself as an ethnographer and autoethnographer. On the other
hand, our goals as researchers and authors
often diverge. Carolyn publishes primarily
personal autoethnographic narratives (e .g.,
Ellis, 1995), coconstructed nan-atives (e.g.,
Ellis & Bochner, 1992), and methodological
commentaries for those who appreciate and
work at the intersection of social sciences
and humanities (e.g., Ellis et al ., 1997), thus
troubling the distinction between humanities and social sciences. Laura offers systematic qualitative analyses to more conventional social science audiences in health
communication and family communication
(Ellingson, 2002, 2003, in press-a; Ellingson
& Sotirin, 2006), alongside her narrative and
autoethnographic writing (Ellingson, 1998;
2005b ), gleefully troubling the distinctions
within genres of social science (Ellingson,
2005a).
Socially constructed categories such as
autoethnography do not exist in a vacuum.
Social institutions, laws and regulations, media, advocates representing various positions, and more make up th e matrix in
which ideas are created, maintained, and
changed over time (Hacking, 1999). In no
context is this more apparent than in universities and research institutions. Social
constructionists posit that the conventional
standards of scientific inquiry developed
during the Enlightenment- to remain dis-

passionate, control the conditions, convert
observations to numerals, search for the answer, and separate truth from practice-are
rhetorically constructed to privilege the
powerful elite and marginalize other voices
(Gergen, 1999, pp. 91- 93). Although not
suggesting that such research is without
value, Gergen counters its claims to a privileged status in the process of knowledge production.
Autoethnography developed in large part
as a response to the alienating effects on
both researchers and audiences of impersonal, passionless, abstract claims of truth
generated by such research practices and
clothed in exclusionary scientific discourse
(Ellis, 2004). It attempts to disrupt and
breach taken-for-granted norms of scientific
discourse by emphasizing lived experience,
intimate details, subjectivity, and personal
perspectives. Thus autoethnography as a:
method participates in the ongoing social
construction of research norms and practices at the same time that it seeks to in.flu-.
ence the social construction of specific phe~
nomena (e.g., child abuse; Hacking, 1999).

Troubling Dichotomies
and Socially Constructing
Alternative Research Modes
We now turn to a discussion of dichotomies
that pervade research and explore how
autoethnography troubles these divisions;
often providing alternative modes of experiencing the process of research. We invite
readers to think through and beyond polarities such as researcher-researched, o~ectivity~
subjectivity, process- product, self- others,
art-science, and personal- political.

Researcher-Researched
The researcher-researched dichotomy is undone, or at least unraveled, by autoethnographies in which the author becomes a
participant and the author's experiences,
emotions, and meanings become data for
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exploration. To a greater or lesser extent, researchers incorporate their personal experiences and standpoints in their research by
starting with a story about themselves, explaining their personal connection to the
project, or by using personal knowledge to
help them in the research process (e.g.,
Holman Jones, 1998; Linden, 1992). Feminism contributed significantly to legitimizing the autobiographical voice associated
with reflexive ethnography (e.g., Behar,
1996; Personal Narratives Group, 1989;
Richardson, 1997).
Qualitative methodologists refer to the
process of researching the self as introspection (Ellis, 1991b). Introspection involves
the researcher in generating diaries, journals, freewriting, field notes, and narratives
of his or her lived experiences, thoughts,
and feelings, and then using these as data.
"Resurrecting introspection (conscious
awareness of awareness or self-examination)
as a systematical sociological technique will
allow social constructionists to examine
emotion as a product of the individual processing of meaning as well as socially shared
cognitions" (Ellis, 1991b, p. 23). I (Carolyn)
used this technique to construct the experience of grief for my family, my neighbors,
and myself in my story of my brother's sudden death:
Even with the planning, we did not anticipate
the effect seeing the flag-draped casket would
have on my mother on Sunday night when our
family went to the funeral home to receive
friends . Silently, we walk through the bitter
cold weather and into the funeral home. When
my mother sees the casket, she screams, "My
baby. Oh my baby is dead." She collapses to the
floor, while the rest of us stand rooted to our
spots. It is like a play rehearsal, and my mother
has messed up her lines. In slow motion, we finally help her up and support her still sobbing
to a chair. My once-powerful and imposing father looks helplessly on, confused, as someone
approaches to remove his coat.
Several hundred people have come to pay
respects. [My brother] Art and I shake hands
or hug each one, thank them for their expres-

a
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sions of sorrow, exchange light talk, smile,
sometimes even laugh. "It is God's will. " "God
will look after him," they say to make us and
themselves feel better. I nod. The same sentences are uttered over and over. It doesn't
matter. There are no points for originality.
(Ellis, 1993, pp. 720-721)

Using my own experiences, reflections
and memories, I reconstructed myself and
people emotionally close to me and to the
tragic event I describe as a story told within
the context of my ongoing relationships
with family and friends . By looking inward
for data, I, the researcher, became both the
subject and obj ect of research.
I (Laura) also turned an analytic lens on
myself, but as part of a larger ethnographic
project. I engaged in sensemaking about myself and my participants in my fieldwork in
an interdisciplinary geriatric oncology program at a regional cancer center {Ellingson,
1998). I wrote a layered piece that was essentially an account of how I constructed an understanding of my relationship to the patients, their loved ones, and the staff, to
whom I was a researcher and cancer survivor. Unlike Carolyn, I constructed accounts
of patients I met only briefly and staff I knew
but who were not part of my intimate circle.
In order to explore connections among my
own previous experiences as a cancer patient and my understanding of the people in
the clinic in which I was conducting an ethnography, I both wrote narratives based on
memories and reconstructed events based
on accounts in my personal journals written
at the time of my diagnosis and treatment
for bone cancer: that is, "the process
of opening inward [allowed) me to reach
outward toward understanding" others
(Berger, 2001, p. 515).
The following excerpt tells of spending
Christmas in the hospital in Vermont while
suffering from septicemia, a serious illness
brought on by infection and the compromising of my immune system due to chemotherapy. After going out for lunch with my
brother and father, I cry in my hospital bed:
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Dad and Mark leave early to beat the storm
home, and, with a lump in my throat, I watch
them go. They take my presents with them,
since I have no use for them in the hospital.
How can the-y leave? Why didn't Mom come? When
will this end? I think bitterly to myself that they

all care, but then they get to go home. It is not
their bodies pierced with needles. Too weak to
make it to the toilet on crutches, having to use
a bedpan. Schedule determined by blood
counts and temperature. Leg aching, stomach
queasy, buttocks numb from sitting in the bed
day after day. Alone I lay flat on my back and
stare at the ceiling all evening. My constant, silent tears creep slowly from the outer corners
of my eyes and drip into my ears. (Ellingson,
1998, p. 506)

The inspiration for this story was a line in my
journal, written at the lowest point of my
spirits during treatment, in which I had written, "I discovered that when I cry while laying flat on my back, my tears drip into my
ears." I analyzed my own experiences and
joined them with my analysis of field notes
of my participants. Through autoethnography, I demonstrated that the taken-forgranted demarcation between staff and
patient is slippery, for all bodies bespeak vulnerability.

Objectivity-Subjectivity
Being labeled subjective or biased, as it is often
called, commits the worst of the deadly sins
within the positivists' worldview. Scientists
socially constructed the rules of science
centuries ago, and these rules remain entrenched in academic discourse and in
Western societies in general. Supporters
construct and present objectivity and subjectivity as a dichotomy with clear points of demarcation, and they prize objectivity and dismiss or even ridicule subjectivity. From a
social constructionist perspective, objectivity is not fundamental or inherent in science
but "is primarily a linguistic achievement
that draws on the machine metaphor of human functioning" (Gergen, 1994, p. 165).
Claiming objectivity does not make it so but
rather signifies the power and authority of a

person or group to assert their particular
perspective over that of other persons or
groups. Because power and knowledge intricately intertwine, the authority to judge and
label some knowledge as objective-and thus
valuable-ensures that the powerful remain
so, as knowledge disputing the status quo
power relations is always already delegitimated (see Foucault, 1975).
Autoethnography interferes with this dichotomy by drawing blurry lines between
detached, external knowledge and personal,
internal knowledge. Much of the rhetorical
force of this dichotomy lies in the invocation
of objective accounts as rational and of subjective ones as emotional. In actual practice,
however, reading emotions of self and other
often forms a necessary precursor for rational action (Ellis, 1991a). Autoethnographers
weave their own emotions into their research accounts and "plunge directly into
the subjective fray, at times becoming passionately engrossed" (Gubrium & Holstein,
1997, p. 59).
For example, I (Laura) not only admit but
celebrate my subjectivity. I wrote in an account of the geriatric oncology clinic:
While many confessional tales have as their
goal the reassurance of the reader that their
findings are "uncontaminated" and hence "scientific" and "valid" (Van Maanen, 1988), I have
as my goal the opposite: to reassure the reader
that my findings are thoroughly contaminated.
This contamination with my own lived experience results in a rich, complex understanding
of the staff and patients of the clinic in which I
am observing (and of my own cancer experience) . . .. For the first time, I now enter the oncology context with no immediate implications
for my own health or that of a loved one. Yet, I
do not study the patients and staff of the clinic
with detachment; my own experiences as a patient filter what I see, hear, and feel. (Ellingson,
1998, p. 494)

In reclaiming contamination, I move beyond confessing my subjectivity to reveling
in the possibilities of subjectivity for understanding a complex topic.
I (Carolyn) also eschew the objectivitysubjectivity dichotomy. In addition to advo-
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eating for the impossibility of detachment in
research (Ellis, 2004), I demonstrate the importance of subjective understanding by allowing some narratives to stand on their
own without any analysis, explanation, or
contextualization within a field of research.
For example, in a narrative about my
mother's hospitalization, I tell of lovingly
caring for her:
Taking care of her feels natural, as though she
is my child. The love and concern flowing between us feels like my mom and I are falling in
love. The emotionality continues during the
four days and nights I stay with her in the hospital. My life is devoted temporarily to her wellbeing. She knows it and is grateful. I am grateful for the experience. I do not mind that she is
dependent on me. I am engrossed by our feeling, by the seemingly mundane but, for the
moment, only questions that matter. Are you
dizzy? In pain? Comfortable? Do you want to
be pulled up in bed? (Ellis, 1996, p. 242)

This embodied tale provides concrete details of caring for an elderly parent. I do not
attempt to establish distance from the experience. My sensemaking is visceral and in the
moment. I tell the tale as I understand it so
that others can experience the particularity
of my experience through my story. My
choice to publish an openly personal (read:
subjective) story without the scaffolding of
detachment that frames most qualitative
work, including much autoethnographytheories, reviews of literature, methodological details-radically refuses to reify the
opposition of objectivity and subjectivity. In
so doing, I celebrate the individual's view as
sufficient for making meaning, and I participate in troubling the taken-for-grantedness
of the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy in
research.

Process- Product
Autoethnography
encompasses
both
process-what one does-and product- what
one gets after it is done. Autoethnography
reflexively celebrates and often explicitly integrates processes into the product (Ellis,

¢)
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2004). Revealing and interrogating the
processes of research is critical to autoethnography and counters the historical imperative to obscure the details of the construction of research findings using
sanitizing strategies such as passive voice
(e.g., the data were collected; it was found that)
(Gergen, 1994; Richardson, 2000). In the
field, during solitary introspection, and/ or
while participating in interactive reflection
with others, autoethnographers engage in
embodied action, not just report on distant
processes (Ellingson, 2006). Often this takes
the form of revealing the researcher's complex role in a study of a specific context and
of acknowledging the messiness and mistakes that inevitably imbue the process of
conducting such research.
Ethnographers-Laura included- tend to
want to publish the most credible and persuasive version of our stories when we seek
to influence policy, practice, and/ or theory
(Ellingson, in press-a). Hence we often sanitize our accounts, omitting missteps as irrelevant, tangential, or overly personal; historically, such confessional tales were kept
separate from authoritative accounts of research (Tedlock, 1991; Van Maanen, 1988).
Granted, we take a risk when we combine
confessions of embarrassing moments with
passionate calls for social, political, and professional change based on our findings;
many will dismiss out of hand work that admits to a messy process (see Ellingson,
2005a, in press-a). However, when we pretend that research progresses smoothly, we
provide inaccurate and deceptively simplistic maps for those who read our work. In addition to field work, the writing of accounts
of our work also reflects an embodied,
messy process that is inextricably bound to
the final products of our research.
For example, here I (Laura) give a glimpse
of the story of writing my ethnography of
the geriatric oncology clinic:
I have had it with my body. I am sick to death of
laying around my little house recoveiing from
my knee replacement surgery and trying to
write with my laptop balanced precariously on
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my uneven lap ... to write so personally about
my understanding of the clinic seems impossible from the primarily prone, pain-filled position I grudgingly inhabit these days. Somehow,
I can engage in systematic and detached writing, but the combination of my physical pain
and the psychic wounds that accompany it are
so fresh, so immediate, that attempting to dig
into my body memories for insights is like rubbing salt into open wounds. Unwelcome memories of the repeated violations of my body . . .
surface every time a wave of nausea hits or the
pain spikes. I have no energy for embodiment
right now. (Ellingson, 2005a, pp. 77- 78)

Of course, my example also illustrates a profound resistance to the socially constructed
mind-body dichotomy that deeply influences Western cultures. Social constructionists do not deny that material bodies exist
apart from discourse but argue that their
meanings are inseparable: "bodies are not
only constrained or damaged but also constituted by discursive relations, social practices, and historical processes" (Ziarek,
2005, p. 88). My body always forms part of
the process of research, and openly discussing how that happens troubles the processproduct divide.
In more personal-focused autoethnography, the process of constructing the tale
may be alluded to or included explicitly. I
(Carolyn) tell the story of sharing with my
mother a narrative I had written about our
relationship (Ellis, 2001). The story chronicles my mother's verbal and nonverbal reactions to hearing the former story I had written about taking care of her. Then, in an
italicized parallel narrative interwoven into
the story, I reflect upon my own reactions to
sharing the story with my mother:
As I read this to her, I notice tears in her eyes. I
think again of how difficult it is to know what
to say in these situations. I also think that
bluntly acknowledging that she may never get
better might be difficult for both of us. Our relationship, to some extent, is based on joy. I
come home to make her feel better, and it usually works. Yes, perhaps feeling better might
mean accepting the pain and living the best life

she can in spite of it. Certainly, I don't want her
to feel like she has to play down the pain or
pretend to think she will g·et better just to make
me feel good. Or do I? Do I want a relationship
based upon reality and truth? Could I stand it?
... I know there will come a time when she and
I will have this conversation. But not yet. (Ellis,
2001, p. 604)

The account of modifying my story as I
read it to my mother displays the usually hidden processes of adapting to one's audience
and considering the effects of one's words
upon those who are characters in my stories.
Moving beyond merely using active voice
and owning one's own involvement in
research processes, I resist the processproduct dichotomy by highlighting the processes that led to the product, thus
destabilizing the product as a fixed interpretation of an event and opening up possibilities for multiple understandings. I try to
show how research findings, as well as hope
and truth, are socially constructed in relationships, and how negotiation might
change as the research and illness progress. I
also show what I learned about the product
from focusing on the process of research.

Self- Others
In social constructionist theory, the self exists only in relation to others. The self is not
a discrete, individual, fixed entity as promoted in Enlightenment philosophy but
connected to others for understanding. We
understand the self "not as an individual's
personal and private cognitive structure but
as discourse about the self- the performance
of languages available in the public sphere
. . . the self as narrative rendered intelligible
within ongoing relationships" (Gergen,
1994, p. 185; see also Holstein & Gubrium,
2000). Autoethnography points to the self as
embedded in cultural meanings. Doing
autoethnography affects the social construction of the author's self. People make sense
of their experiences through the stories they
develop about them (Bruner, 1990). These
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stories are continually altered, never static;
we can retell them in ways that make them fit
better the "I" who tells them (see Jago,
2006). Doing autoethnography affects individuals who do the work of "re-storying"
their lives; the autoethnographic story becomes part of the life, an element of the ongoing construction of self. At times the story
stands in for the experience itself and becomes what one remembers as the experience (Ellis, 2004).
Often autoethnographies feature stories
of resistance to stigmatizing labels. As Kenneth Gergen (2006) suggests, "When one
commits to the dominant logics, values, and
sanctioned patterns of action within a
group, it is often at the expense of hushed
but valued impulses to the contrary"
(p. 122). Giving voice to those hushed impulses becomes a political act because language is indeterminate and imbued with
power relations. Autoethnography troubles
the socially constructed categories by showing how they play out in the world and how
we incorporate them into our identities-or
do not. "Ways of classifying human beings
interact with the human beings who are classified" (Hacking, 1999, p. 31). Hacking calls
this an "interactive" kind of classification, as
those who are classified modify their behaviors and beliefs because they are affected by
the classification label (as opposed to labeling an element as iron, which causes no
change in the element's particles).
The process can work both ways, as Carolyn demonstrates in her story about the role
of personal details and analysis in her study
of minor bodily stigma:
I doubt that I would have been able to move
outside the category of minor bodily stigmas
without first immersing myself in it. Categories
too often limit us without our being aware of
their influence; once we are aware, too often
we assume there is no use in trying to break
through them. Telling and analyzing my personal story not only helped generate and make
visible the category of minor bodily stigma, it
also provided a way through. The categorical
story offered a name to my experiences where
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before there was only dread; the personal story
connected real people with feelings to the labels, where before there were only tactics of
concealment and denial. Ibis research helped
me understand the inextricable connections
between categorical and personal knowledge.
(Ellis, 1998, p. 535)

Often labels become essentialized, taken as
inherent to a group instead of recognized
as socially constructed (Ziarek, 2005). Focusing on individual narratives of selfcategorization troubles the naturalness of
such categories.
Collaborative self-making, such as that
which occurs in interactive interviews and
focus groups, provides another opportunity
in autoethnogTaphy to produce meaning
that is "neither subjective nor objective but
intersubjective" (Onyx & Small, 2001, p. 775,
original emphasis). In interactive research,
participants act in an equal relationship as
coresearchers with other authors/ researchers, share authority, and author their own
lives in their own voices. The group helps
each member to construct the self. These approaches give us a way to include the voice
and feedback of all participants (Hawes,
1994; Reed-Danahay, 2001) and to understand how participants "assign meaning to
their realities," rather than how we as researchers evaluate their realities (Daly, 1992,
p. 8; see also Davis & Ellis, in press).
Bringing the idea of interactive interviews
to traditional focus groups, Carolyn, Cris
Davis, and associates (Davis, Ellis, Myerson,
Poole, & Smith-Sullivan, 2006) have developed a methodological approach called interactive focus groups. More than simply a
large interactive interview, this method borrows characteristics from traditional focus
groups and other methods, such as interactive interviewing (Ellis et al., 1997; Holstein
& Gubrium, 1995), interactive group interviews (Patton, 2002), leaderless discussion
groups (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990), and
the therapy practice of reflecting teams (e.g.,
Andersen, 1987, 1995). In an ongoing project on re/ claiming middle age, Carolyn and
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four other women-all middle-aged (45-60
years old) white professionals-discuss aging
for women in 2006. These conversations
take place in interactive focus groups.
"I think that women like us arc socially constructing a different story [from our mothers]," Mary says. "We're not buying the canonical story about what it's like to be an older
won1an."
Carolyn interjects, "What was one of the
first conversations everyone had when we first
walked in the door?"
Kendall laughs. "Oh my age, oh my this, oh
my allergies. My innards are so, blah, blah
blah."
"Right," Carolyn says. She turns to Marilyn.
''Look what we talk about when we go walking
every week."
Marilyn and Carolyn respond together.
"How are your aches and pains today?"
"Yeah," Carolyn says, "and it feels a lot like
the conversations I used to hear my mother
have." (Davis et al., 2006, p. 10}

As researchers and participants, we probe
the prevailing social constructions of
middle-aged women and debate how such
constructions reflect and do not reflect our
lived realities as women.
The highlighting of process in autoethnography complements the work that the
product, or representation, does in the
world-in academia and beyond. "Human
science inquiry is itself a form of social action. Knowledge and application are not
fundamentally separable" (Gergen, 1994,
p. 140). Readers take a more active role as
they are invited into the author's world, as
feelings are evoked about the events being
described, and as they are stimulated to use
what they learn there to reflect on, understand, and cope with their own lives. Autoethnographers write meaningfully and
evocatively about topics that matter and that
may make a difference, include sensory and
emotional experience (Shelton, 1995), and
write from an ethic of care and concern
(Denzin, 1997; Richardson, 1997). Carolyn
invites readers to connect and identify with

her and even to be inspired by her to write
their own stories:
I provide my story as an incentive for you to
put your own into words, compare your experience to mine, and find companionship in
your sorrow (Mairs, 1993}. I speak my story so
that you feel liberated to speak yours without
feeling guilty that others suffered more and
therefore your story is not worth telling, your
feelings unjustified. I believe we each need to
find personal and collective meaning in the
events that have transpired and in the disrupted and chaotic lives left behind. (Ellis,
2002b, p. 378)

Autoethnography intentionally blurs the
lines between self and others, between the
author's particular experiences and the
universality of those same experiences.
Whereas autoethnographies of tragic and
painful or at least difficult circumstances,
such as most of Carolyn's and Laura's work,
emphasize making meaning and forging
connections, others call to joy and playfulness, to making connections with autoethnographers who want to share positive
experiences as opportunities for others to
celebrate their own strengths, successes, and
pleasures (e.g., Drew, 2001; Ellis, 2006;
Lockford, 2004; Tillmann-Healy, 2001). It
may be that we feel the connection between
ourselves and others most readily in the
wake of pain, fear, and loss, but we also construct our positive meanings in relationship
to others.

Art-Science
In the writing of evocative accounts, autoethnographers blend analysis and narrative,
troubling the socially constructed chasm between science and the arts (Ellis, 2004). The
choice of a genre influences perception of
the audience regardless of the intended
meaning of the piece:
for the constructionist, there is good reason to
be concerned with the form of writing . . . our
accounts of the world are not maps of the
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world, but operate performatively, to do things
with others. [We ask] what kind of world do we
build together through our forms of inscription? (Gergen, 1999, p. 185)

Autoethnographers seek to build a world,
largely within the academy but also beyond,
hi which art and science do not exist as a
rigid and fixed dichotomy but instead form
continuum of practices. Rather than opposing traditional social science, most autoethnographers (Carolyn and Laura among
them) instead choose to engage in productive play with social science writing and research conventions, shedding light on the
constructed nature of the art-science dichotomy and casting doubt on its inevitability or exclusive claims to truth.
One way to accomplish that goal involves
framing a narrative in a discussion of research and theory before and/ or after the
narrative as I (Carolyn) did in writing about
my brother's death. I followed the story with
ah analysis of surviving the accidental death
cif a loved one and a discussion of my desire
to reposition social scientists and their readers closer to literature. I wrote:

a

· This article brings ["after death"] into the
open, allowing us to converse about and try to
understand it. As such it accomplishes what
Rorty (1982) says we should expect from social
scientists- "to act as interpreters for those with
whom we are not sure how to talk." ... This is,
after all, what we "hope for from our poets and
dramatists and novelists" (Rorty, 1982, p. 202).
... I seek to reposition readers vis a vis the authors of texts of social science research, evoking feeling and identification as well as cognitive processing. As you read this story, some of
you may have felt empathy with me, as you
would in watching a "true-to-life" movie; some
of you may have been reminded of parallels in
your own lives, as in reading a good novel. Perhaps reading my work evoked in you emotional experience that you could then examine,
or led to recall of other emotional situations in
which you have participated. Acknowledging a
potential for optional readings gives readers license to take part in an experience that can reveal to them not only how it was for me ( the au-
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thor), but how it could be or once was for
them. (Ellis, 1993, pp. 725 - 726)

Laura's social science autoethnographies
usually contain citations to other academics
and use an academic, disciplinary vocabulary. Layered accounts (Ronai, 1995) move
back and forth between academic prose and
narrative, revealing their constructed nature
through the juxtaposition of social science
and narrative ways of knowing. In her ongoing ethnography of an outpatient dialysis
unit, Laura experiments with layering poetic
representation of interview transcript excerpts with academic discussion of the social
construction of professionalism in health
care to explore the knowledge construction
of the dialysis technicians. Medical professionals whose formal education far exceeds
that of the technicians largely ignore or
even scorn these paraprofessionals' expertise. Technicians resemble artisans, with a
great deal of hands-on, tactile knowledge
that is vital to caregiving but difficult to
transmit.
One poem, entitled 'Joking Around," describes how the technicians adapt to the
preferences of the patients they work with
over long periods of time:
Yeah, you joke around with him, 'cause I
remember when he first came
to this clinic, he was
well to me he still is,
a grumpy old man

It took me a week or so until I figured
him out.
Give him a bad time.
Argue with him
and it makes him happy. That's him.
You've got to be I hate to say it
To him it's not disrespectful, but
you got to be
kind of like disrespectful towards him
and speak to him basically in his own
language
in order for him to be happy.
And he has to complain
to be happy ha ha
Oh I love that old man.
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He's one of those patients that when it's
time
for him to go it's gonna hurt.
And other patients it's "Yes ma'am, No
ma'am"

'cause that's the way they want it and
with no joking around. (Ellingson, 2007)

These excerpts from the poem reflect my editing of the technician's words and, as such,
reveal my views of his role in the dialysis
unit. I constructed the poem to show what
I appreciated about this man-his earthy
charm, innate kindness and gentleness, what
I perceived to be his sincere attempts to
serve his patients "as a professional." This
blurring of the boundaries of art and science
in my writing enriches readers' understanding of the culture of this dialysis unit.

Personal-Political
The impetus for arguing that something is
socially constructed generally arises when a
phenomenon appears to be natural and inevitable (Hacking, 1999). Feminists have
long argued that the personal is political. Resisting the dichotomy of what should be private and what should be public, what is an individual issue and what is a matter for the
collective to address, often figures prominently in autoethnography. Autoethnographers address issues such as child sexual
abuse (Ronai, 1995), bulimia (TillmanHealy, 1996 ), the ravages of irritable bowel
syndrome (Defenbaugh, in press), and the
death of a parent (Berger, 1997), bringing
painful, intimate topics to share with others.
Many times autoethnography sheds light on
uncomfortable issues that others wish would
remain hidden.
The article I (Carolyn) coauthored with
my partner Art on our abortion experience
exemplifies the politics of a personal choice
and the personal implications of a hotly contested political issue. We wrote:
No doubt, other persons who have faced abortion have felt the sense of not knowing how to

feel about or interpret what was happening· to
them. Others surely have been as bruised as we
were by the contradictions and ambivalence associated with the constraints of choice. The absence of personal narratives to detail the emotional complexities and ambivalence often
attributed generally to abortion . . . may be
only the result of people feeling forced to accept these blows of fate passively or being subjected to taboos against expressing these disturbing feelings openly. Because abortion may
still be deemed immoral . . . it can become
nearly impossible to find the words to talk
about what happened. Making public and vivid
some of the intricate details of abortion may
break the barriers that shield public awareness
and prevent marginalized voices of both
women and men from being heard. (Ellis &
Bochner, 1992, p. 99)

As narrators and performers of this story,
we gained a perspective on our experience
and a sense of what it meant that we did not
have before. The responses of others to our
performance and text strongly suggest that
they have been moved to feel and think
about themselves and others in new and important ways and to grasp and feel the ambivalence, confusion, and pain associated
with experiences of abortion such as ours.
The response to the content of this story has
been both positive and negative, which of
course met our intent of opening up conversations, though it remains difficult to hear
some of the condemning remarks.
Bodily details are certainly another one of
those personal details that many people .
would rather not know. I (Laura) include
many of those in my book on an interdisciplinary team, showing my experiences as a
cancer patient receiving chemotherapy, using my own suffering to connect me to the
patients and hospital where I did my research. For example:
A sharp pain in my lower abdomen startled me
into wal<efulness and I groaned in recognition.
I searched the bed for my nurse-call button
and pushed it. Glancing over at the rapidly
dripping IV line, I cursed the need for continuous hydration to save my kidneys from the on-
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slaught of toxic chemicals that was injected in
that morning. The bone cancer had left my
right leg a mess of grafts, stitches, and staples;
there was no way I could get out of the bed,
find my crutches, and hobble co the bathroom
without losing control of my bladder. I was beyond exhaustion, and by the time I woke up,
my bladder was so full it hurt. I'd have to wait
for my nurse, Chris, to bring a bed pan. . ..
The hot yellow liquid streamed from my urethra without my consent and the searing
flames of shame swept over my face. Defeated,
I let the tears flow with the urine. My pelvic
muscles relaxed gratefully even as my buttocks
cringed in retreat from the growing wetness
that surrounded them. (Ellingson, 2005a,
p. 87)

We engage in political work when we openly
discuss bodily details that society tells us are
shameful, for we resist the social imperative
to remain ashamed and hence complicit in
our powerlessness (Mairs, 1997).
We embrace troubling the taken-forgrantedness of the world in order to give
voice to oppression and move people to action or new beliefs and understandings. Yet
social constructionist projects such as
autoethnography are not inherently liberating; material realities do not change simply
because we reveal their origins and sociopolitical complexities; poverty, for example,
may be shown to be socially constructed as
being the fault of the poor, but noting unjust
portrayals does nothing to alleviate the
crushing oppression of poverty. People
must be in a position to benefit from the critical analysis offered by autoethnography
and other critical methods: "Social construction theses are liberating chiefly for those
who are on the way to being liberated . . .
[those] whose consciousness has already
been raised" (Hacking, 1999, p. 2). Some
methods claim liberation as an explicit intent of their project: Practitioners of the
memory-work method suggest it "is thus explicitly liberationist in its intent" (Onyx &
Small, 2001, p. 774). The connection between intention and action may blur, however.
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Ian Hacking (1999) describes six "grades"
of commitment invoked by different constructionist projects. His continuum spans
from historical constructionism, which analyzes a phenomenon and posits that it is the
result of historical events and social processes and hence not inevitable, through
revolutionary constructionism that overtly
moves beyond writing and "the world of
ideas" (1999, p . 20) to strive to bring about
concrete change in the world. Autoethnography may reflect any grade of commitment
to change. Many people's lives have been
transformed through the process of composing their own stories and of hearing
those of others; others have been moved to
action through telling and reading personal
narratives (Ellis, 2002a). Thus autoethnography certainly can be one tool in the social
change tool box, particularly in its potential
to spark creative and productive discourse.
Dialogue moves us toward constructing a
better world (Gergen, 2006). Many, if not
most, researchers publish autoethnography
in academic outlets. Those who seek
broader audiences and revolutionary social
change may need to move beyond traditional academic outlets, such as journals,
handbooks, and edited collections, to mainstream outlets, such as trade and popular
books.

Could Dichotomies Be Useful?:
A Concluding Dialogue
Carolyn: Laura, after cowriting this chapter with you, I was thinking about how dichotomies come to seem so natural and
inevitable; "the reality of everyday life is
taken for granted as reality" (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966, p. 23). We seldom notice how often we invoke these socially
constructed norms within social science
simply because they are so foundational to
our sense of methodological reality. While
autoethnography
troubles
tal<en-forgranted dichotomies, this method can also
reinscribe them.
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You operate primarily in the large middle
ground of the methodological continuum,
so nondichotomous thinking may be to your
advantage. For me, working on the humanities end, which traditional ethnographers
view as more marginal, that might be less
true. Politically, it might be smart for me to
encourage people to think in terms of dichotomies, at least for a while, because it
brings focus to what I do. For example, Leon
Anderson's (2006) article, which views analytic and evocative autoethnographies as dichotomous, actually had the unintended
consequence of calling the attention of an
audience of realist ethnographers to the
kind of autoethnography I do. It provided a
venue for autoethnographers to speak back
and "claim" territory, which is important in
this phase of the interpretive "social movement" going on in ethnographic circles. The
resistance of Art [Bochner] and me to the realists' attempt to claim and rename autoethnography put us in the center of the
debate. We have something other, more
mainstream ethnographers want. I recognize this as dichotomous thinking, but I still
think it can be useful as long as we see it for
what it is-a political strategy rather than
necessarily useful for knowledge production.
Laura: You're arguing for strategic essentialism a la Gayatri Spivak (1988), who suggests that we can't fight for women's (or
other groups') rights ifwe unrelentingly deconstruct the category of women. Thus you
can't uphold the value of what you do as an
autoethnographer if you can't define it and
stake some territory.
Carolyn: I believe that. But we need not
have a rigid definition of autoethnography,
in terms of what's included and what's excluded from the category (Ellis, 2004).
Autoethnography is an evolving and fluid
approach. But to call a work autoethnography means it should share at least some, if
not all, of the most important elements of
the category-a focus on personal story, evocation, and narrative writing. Anderson's
conception of autoethnography didn't em-

phasize any of these. I am concerned that
those in power positions or who fear losing
relative power may try to appropriate
autoethnography primarily by watering it
down so much that it is unrecognizable and
thus no longer potentially challenging to
their definitions of what is included in ethnography and what is not.
Laura: I recognize the political necessity
of challenging existing power structures and
their policing of disciplinary and methodological boundaries (Blair, Brown, & Baxter,
1994). But relying on existing dichotomies
to take our stand concedes most of the
ground to those in power before we even begin. As Audre Lorde (1984) explained, "The
master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" (p. 110). Reifying positivist dichotomies in order to challenge the socially
constructed boundaries of methodological
legitimacy seems no more effective as a dismantling strategy. The question for me becomes, then, how do we help everyone
to stake tl1eir ground-including my boundary spanning, crystallizing ground-in
ways that go beyond defining our stories
dichotomously-as not analysis, our analysis
as not loose or weak, our personal details as
not distant, our grounded theory as not
merely one case?
This recalls Gergen's ideas about how we
define things in opposition. Scholars understand the positivist rules of social science
primarily through what they exclude~
subjectivity, intimacy, stories, and so onand autoethnographers have challenged
these socially constructed standards by flagrantly violating them (Gergen, 1999). I can
see why that is helpful. When Leon uses the
analytic versus evocative dichotomy, he enables you to speak up for your position~
However, this also recollects what I said
about how dichotomies present as opposites
what are actually interdependent for mean"
ing. Thus we cannot have autoethnography
if there isn't realist ethnography for con~
trast.
Carolyn: Though the realists would like to
think they can have realist ethnography with0 .
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out autoethnography because they think
realist ethnography is ethnography and
autoethnography, if it should exist at all,
would be subsumed under their label. That's
what can happen if we don't honor dichotomies, I'm afraid. We all become one category, like women all used to be lumped
under mankind, and masculine pronouns
stood for all of us.
I think nuanced disagreement is important. Don't new ways of thinking come out of
this kind of dialogue? And aren't things
sometimes improved with new paradigms
that address gaps and holes that older paradigms ignore or miss? Conflict can be useful;
it can point the way for change. Sometimes
it's productive to get our dander up, feel a
little angry, and be determined to show the
value of our position. You might argue that
adrenaline could limit our perspective, but I
also think feeling revved up about something can help us do deeper work. I feel
that's been the case for me.
Besides, too much lukewarm agreement,
which I predict would happen if we gave up
entirely on dichotomies, would interfere
with the word games that academics like to
play. Sometimes when I argue with realists
over meanings, I wonder if that's all we're
doing- acting as wordsmiths. I don't know
how important these games are in the whole
scheme of things. Sometimes I think this
kind of debate isn't really important at all,
except to protect the few measly resources
represented in the struggle. I doubt word
mining and position defending contribute
to making the world a better place. Maybe
these disagreements simply entertain us until rigor morris sets in.
Laura: I'm not sure how entertaining they
are. In the beginning of autoethnography, it
made sense to harness that adrenaline to reinforce the differences- and hence valueinherent in our position. Someone else had
all the methodological power, and so we began by getting angry and critiquing them to
stake our ground. Feminists started with
similar opposition-race scholars, queer theorists, and now autoethnographers have,

too. But haven't we already made the case
that autoethnography is useful, meaningful,
and legitimate? What comes after anger and
defensiveness? Shouldn't we explore interdependency instead of opposition?
Carolyn: That sounds good in theory, but
in practice it's difficult because the goals of
autoethnographers and realists are different. To be interdependent we have to agree
on goals for our research, or at least agree
that it is legitimate and worthwhile to have
different goals. Autoethnog:raphers honor
meaning, intelligibility, and interpretation
as their goals, whereas the realists look more
to facts and representation. Given these differences, it's hard to agree on how to go
about achieving our purposes (Bochner,
1985). Then there's also power politics.
This conversation makes me laugh, because I'm usually the "let's get along" and
"here are the ways in which we overlap
rather than divide" person, and you're more
into power politics. Now we've switched
sides. I've become more watchful. I don't
want to give in to people who then, instead
of meeting me halfway, view my giving in as
a weakness and an opportunity to control
my voice with theirs.
I try not to think in terms of power politics, but I also know that if I ignore that reality, I stand to lose a lot of ground. Granted,
my work has flourished from my concentrating on what I do well, rather than defending
it and debating with people who criticize
what I do. But sometimes that debate becomes important, because many graduate
students and young professors need senior
scholars to take a position and speak back, to
help them in their quest for their autoethnographic projects to be taken seriously. So
sometimes I think we need to come on
strong and show that we're not going to roll
over and play dead. We're resisting encroachment and defending what we care
about. But I'm aware that this position is inconsistent with what I've argued in the past
and has its consequences, such as conflict
with people who have more similarities with
me than differences.
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Laura: Exactly. Perhaps the first step toward mutual accommodation with productive, collaborative debate is to find a language of interdependency to replace or at
least augment the language of war and
opposition. You present something along
this line in your response to Bill Tierney,
who critiqued autoethnography (Ellis,
2002a).
Carolyn: Yes-I suggested that we respond
to critique with "yes, and ... " rather than
"yes, but.... "
Laura: Yes, and a language of interdependency would explain how autocthnography
needs realist ethnography, how stories call
out for theory, how theories require specific
cases. We need to surrender the battle
metaphors about "laying claim," "seizing
ground," "defending our turf," and "giving
power" to the other side and imagine new
ways of relating-sharing the loaf, swimming
alongside each other, planting a bountiful
garden with many varieties of fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and so on. The use of warlike metaphors fosters an equation of
argument with violence (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980). Because "through language an entire
world can be actualized" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 39), we should consider carefully the implications of our choice to actualize a pervasively violent world. I don't want
to suggest that we pretend there is no conflict but that we introduce language into our
debates that offers some hope of accommodation rather than merely reinvoking the
same old power struggle over who's right
and who's wrong.
Carolyn: Part of a solution is to see oneself as interdependent with members of a
relevant community, such as the community
of ethnographers. For example, in the response to Anderson (Ellis & Bochner, 2006),
I pointed out commonalities among all ofus
who do ethnography, no matter how we label ourselves. I worry sometimes that we
aren't accomplishing as much as we could if
all ethnographers joined together and
thought of themselves as a community with
multiple shared goals and mutual standards.

That would make us a stronger coalition
against the positivists, with whom we have
more differences than we do with each
other. Of course, that just changes the
oppositional group.
Laura: I'd like to know if it is possible to
stand next to the positivists rather than
against them.
Carolyn: I'm not sure we have enough in
common witl1 them, or they with us, to make
standing next to each other a worthwhile
goal.
Laura: Aren't you and I the perfect example? Within the context of our relationship,•
we care deeply about each other. We stand
together. Yet we do different work, and we
disagree, if not on what is legitimate, then
on priorities, on what is most valuable and
worthy of spending our time on. This realization pained me at first, because I not only
cared about you but also wanted you to be
proud ofme. Perhaps it disappointed you as
well. But we moved past that and constructed a way of relating that celebrates our
commonalities and respects our differences.·
As in our relationship, methodologists could
address differences of opinion by making
room for commonalities and differences (oh
no-is that dichotomy[?). I don't want to
sound hopelessly optimistic, and I know ma"
terial outcomes are at stal<.e (like tenure).
Carolyn: You and I get along because we
love and respect each other but also because
we see ourselves as having more commonalities than differences in the areas that matter.
We are both academics, ethnographers,
social scientists, communication scholars,
women, responsible people, and so on. Besides, you're not a positivist! Just kidding.
Our differences really don't amount to
much. What's more interesting to me is
when the differences do matter. If you wrote
a piece that attacked autoethnography, then
our differences would be more salient. The
same might be true if I attacked the work
you do, which is some of what you felt in the
initial stages of your dissertation. It's not as
though our work and relationships can't survive some criticism and disagreement; they
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can. And sometimes they're enhanced as a
result, as I said before. But if all we hear is
critique, especially disrespectful critiqu e ...
well, it has an effect. At some point, it would
be nice to show some appreciation for the
work of others. Maybe academics just don't
show enough respect for what those doing
different work are achieving. We're
schooled in the "shootout at the OK Corral"
mode. That's hard to get rid of-try as we
might-for us as well as "them."
Laura: I agree that more traditional researchers seldom express respect for
autoethnographers, at least not overtly, and
many offer criticism. And I am continually
amazed by how much casual bashing of others' work I hear in the hallways at conferences (let alone in sessions), by people
ranging all across the methodological continuum. Perhaps I find this particularly painful because my work spans a larger than average chunk of the continuum, leaving me
vulnerable to critique from a great number
of positions. I am left to ponder, could we
move past tolerance to appreciation of differences? And can we do that without reinforcing dichotomies? Maybe not. Maybe I'm
too idealistic, and dichotomies really are
needed for clarification and debate.
Carolyn: No, don't give up that easily. We
need the large, messy middle ground to hold
us all together, and right now I feel pretty
messy. This conversation makes me aware
that I can and often do construct my position about dichotomies from both sides . .. I
mean, at numerous points along the continuum. While I see this kind of questioning
and messiness as functional for helping me
think through what's going on, it's not a
strength that is appreciated often in the
academy. The academy rewards us for
"taking and defending a position." Maybe
that's what leads to dichotomies-the push
to take a position, make a case, defend our
work.
Laura: As you know, I'm happiest in the
messy middle ground. Do you think we can
ever find a peaceful academic corral to replace the oppositional "shootout" one?

Carolyn: I surely hope so. But wait a second... .
Laura and Carolyn (Together): Oh, no,
isn't that another dichotomy?

e
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